Vanguard changes the baseline, not the definition
Vanguard raises the cost of hiding something from the protected operating system, because it is loaded before most user software and stays resident. It does not change what Riot's Terms of Service permit: unauthorised advantage is prohibited regardless of whether a given technique is currently detected.
01
Where Vanguard sits in the stack
Vanguard installs a kernel-mode driver that starts with the operating system, not with the game. That design choice is deliberate: it removes the window in which a user could load something before the anti-cheat initialises, and it means the driver is present on the machine whenever Windows is running.
Because it is resident, Vanguard can observe driver loads, module lists and device enumeration continuously rather than in a snapshot. It also means problems are highly visible: a misconfigured system usually fails to boot the game at all rather than failing silently.
02
What TPM 2.0 and Secure Boot actually enforce
Secure Boot validates the boot chain against keys held in firmware. It prevents an unsigned bootloader or an unsigned early-boot driver from loading before the operating system takes control. TPM 2.0 provides a measured, tamper-evident record of that boot process and a place to seal secrets.
Riot requires both on Windows 11 because together they close the pre-boot window. Neither of them inspects PCIe traffic at runtime, and neither of them is a DMA detector. Secure Boot is not a substitute for an IOMMU, and an IOMMU is not a substitute for Secure Boot 鈥?they cover different phases of execution.
| Mechanism | Protects against | Does not protect against |
|---|---|---|
| Secure Boot | Unsigned bootloader / early driver | Runtime PCIe memory access |
| TPM 2.0 | Boot-chain tampering, key theft | Device-level memory reads |
| IOMMU (VT-d / AMD-Vi) | Unauthorised device memory mapping | Compromised firmware before IOMMU init |
| Kernel DMA Protection | Pre-boot DMA from external ports | Internally installed devices |
03
How a DMA device appears to Vanguard
A PCIe device that presents a valid vendor and device ID, loads no driver in the protected OS, and communicates over an out-of-band link leaves little for a kernel driver to inspect. It still occupies a PCIe slot, and slot occupancy plus firmware configuration are observable facts about the machine.
What Vanguard can act on is the combination of signals: an unexpected endpoint on the bus, a device whose firmware does not match its claimed identity, timing anomalies in game behaviour, and reports from players. Riot has consistently declined to publish detection specifics, which is exactly why third-party claims about what Vanguard "cannot see" should not be trusted.
04
Account bans, hardware bans and the difference that matters
Riot enforces against accounts and, in documented cases, against hardware. A hardware ban associates enforcement with machine identifiers so that a fresh account on the same machine is also refused. This is why "just make a new account" advice is unreliable in Valorant specifically.
For legitimate users the practical risk is second-hand hardware. Refurbished boards and prebuilt systems can carry identifiers from a previous owner. If you are buying used components for a machine that will run Vanguard, ask for the original invoice and test the system before committing.
05
What legitimate hardware work looks like under these rules
Memory forensics, driver development, PCIe protocol analysis and anti-cheat research are all legitimate activities. They are also all incompatible with running the same machine as an account-bound competitive game environment. The standard practice in security labs is physical separation: research hardware on one machine, game accounts on another, no shared identifiers.
Documenting authorisation matters too. If you are testing detection capabilities for a vendor or a research programme, keep the scope document, the target list and the timeline on file. It is the difference between research and a Terms of Service violation.
- Keep research hardware and account hardware physically separate.
- Never reuse disk images or identifiers across the two environments.
- Document authorisation scope before testing anything that resembles a bypass.
- Assume every detection claim has a shelf life measured in weeks, not years.
06
Machine health checklist before you blame the anti-cheat
Most "Vanguard blocked me" reports trace back to configuration, not enforcement. Work through these before opening a ticket, and keep the output 鈥?Riot support will ask for it.
- Confirm TPM 2.0 is enabled and owned in firmware settings.
- Confirm Secure Boot is on and the platform is in UEFI mode, not legacy CSM.
- Confirm Vanguard service and driver are running with a valid signature.
- Check Windows Event Viewer for driver load failures around boot time.
- Disable aggressive third-party "optimiser" tools before testing.
FAQ
Frequently asked questions
01Does Valorant require TPM 2.0 and Secure Boot?
On Windows 11, yes. Riot requires both, and the game will not launch without them. On Windows 10 the requirements differ, but Riot has been steadily tightening them.
02Is Vanguard a kernel-level anti-cheat?
Yes. Vanguard loads a kernel-mode driver at system startup rather than at game launch, and it remains resident while Windows is running.
03Can Secure Boot stop a DMA device?
No. Secure Boot validates the boot chain before the OS takes control. It does not inspect runtime PCIe memory access. IOMMU configuration and Kernel DMA Protection are the mechanisms relevant to device memory access.
04Does Riot hardware ban in Valorant?
Riot has documented hardware-level enforcement. New accounts created on a banned machine can be refused, which is why account-level workarounds are unreliable.
05Is DMA detectable by Vanguard?
Vanguard can enumerate PCIe devices and inspect drivers and firmware signatures. What it can conclude from any specific device is not public, and Riot does not publish detection logic. Treat any definitive claim in either direction as marketing.
SOURCES
