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Game hardware security

Warzone: RICOCHET, Kernel-Level Detection and DMA Hardware

Call of Duty: Warzone is enforced by RICOCHET Anti-Cheat, which differs from most competitors in one important way: Activision runs both a client-side kernel driver and a server-side analysis layer. That combination changes what "undetected" can even mean. This page explains the architecture, the hardware ban mechanics, and where DMA sits in the picture.

Last reviewed: 2026-11-14Published by Heino HMA Hardware Lab

RICOCHET is two systems, not one

The client driver catches what runs on your machine. The server layer catches what your account does. Hardware that hides from the first still has to survive the second, and behavioural detection does not care what PCIe device produced the input.

GameCall of Duty: Warzone
Anti-cheatRICOCHET (client + server)
OperatorActivision
EnforcementAccount + hardware bans

Why RICOCHET runs two detection layers

The client-side driver loads at kernel level and inspects the machine: driver signatures, loaded modules and device enumeration. The server-side layer looks at match telemetry 鈥?aim statistics, reaction times, line-of-sight behaviour, and outcomes that are statistically implausible for a human player.

This split exists because each layer covers the other's blind spot. A kernel driver cannot see what never touches the protected OS. A server cannot see what runs locally. Together they close most of the gap that a purely client-side anti-cheat leaves open.

What DMA looks like to a kernel driver

A PCIe endpoint that presents valid vendor and device identifiers and loads no driver in the protected operating system leaves little for a kernel scanner to read. That is the technical premise behind external DMA hardware, and it is real.

What such a device cannot avoid is that it exists on the bus. Slot occupancy, firmware metadata and the absence of a corresponding driver are all observable facts. Whether a given build acts on any of them is not public, and Activision does not publish detection logic 鈥?which is why any vendor claiming "RICOCHET-proof" is making a claim nobody can verify.

The server layer does not care about hardware

Behavioural detection operates on the output of the account, not the input method. A player who consistently acquires targets through geometry that should be occluded, or who reacts within a window no human reaches, generates a signal regardless of whether the information arrived over PCIe, over a network, or by eye.

This is the part most hardware marketing ignores. Even a perfectly invisible device produces visible behaviour. Activision has published enforcement-wave reports explicitly crediting server-side analysis for bans that the client driver did not produce.

  • Client driver: sees drivers, signatures, device enumeration.
  • Server analysis: sees outcomes, timing and impossible information.
  • Hardware hides from the first; nothing hides from the second except playing normally.

Hardware bans in Call of Duty

Activision applies hardware-level enforcement for repeat and severe violations. The identifiers involved are not published, but the industry-standard set applies: motherboard and SMBIOS strings, disk serials, network adapter addresses and platform UUIDs.

For legitimate buyers this creates second-hand risk. A refurbished board or prebuilt system may carry identifiers from a previous owner's enforcement history. No seller can reliably verify this, and it is a genuine reason to test a used machine on a low-value account first.

Legitimate reasons to care about this

If you work in driver development, memory forensics or anti-cheat research, the practical requirement is physical separation: research hardware on a machine that never signs into an account, and account play on a machine that never runs research tooling. Shared storage images and reused identifiers are how labs accidentally cross the line.

Document authorisation if you are testing detection for a vendor or a research programme. Scope documents are what distinguish research from a Terms of Service violation when someone asks later.

Frequently asked questions

01Does Warzone use a kernel-level anti-cheat?

Yes. RICOCHET includes a kernel-mode driver on PC, and Activision also operates a server-side analysis layer alongside it.

02Is RICOCHET the same as Easy Anti-Cheat?

No. RICOCHET is Activision's own system, developed in-house. It is unrelated to Easy Anti-Cheat or BattlEye.

03Does Activision hardware ban Warzone accounts?

Activision has documented hardware-level enforcement. New accounts created on a banned machine can also be actioned, which makes account-level workarounds unreliable.

04Can a DMA device avoid server-side detection?

No. Server-side analysis operates on match outcomes and timing rather than on hardware. A device that hides locally still produces the behavioural signal the server layer looks for.

Official references

  1. Activision: Terms of Use
  2. Call of Duty: RICOCHET Anti-Cheat
  3. Activision Support
  4. Microsoft: Kernel DMA Protection
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